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Abstract 
 
 While trade liberalization was perhaps the archetype disagreement on development 
strategy in the 1980s and 1990s, in the 1990s and 2000s this role has been taken over by 
water privatization and the passions it arouses. What are the underlying reasons for 
disagreements on water, among those who proclaim to be for poverty reduction? This paper 
tries to understand the nature of the disagreements, and ascribes them to a combination of 
interpretation of the empirical evidence and, more importantly, differences in world view 
on how to assess what constitute good development outcomes, and on how to achieve 
them. It is suggested that the way forward lies in a clear understanding of the basis of 
disagreements, from which, perhaps, a new consensus can be fashioned on water 
privatization. 
                                                 
* T.H. Lee Professor of World Affairs, International Professor of Applied Economics and Management, 
Professor of Economics, Cornell University. This paper is based on a talk given to the Cornell Conference on 
the Ethics of Globalization and Development, September 29-30, 2006. 
1. Introduction: Development Disagreements 
 
 While some held the hope that the fall of the Berlin Wall would also lead to a new 
consensus on development strategies, things do not seem to have turned out that way. Sure, 
the fall of the wall also signaled the demise of full blown central planning as a serious 
development strategy. The converse of full blown market capitalism was, for a while, seen 
as the only viable alternative. Such was though to be the powerful message of 1989 that 
Fukuyama’s phrase “the end of history” came to signify the start of a new beginning, with 
all past assumptions and experiences having to be reconsidered—in the economic as well 
as the political realm. But the reality of the last two decades has been messier than that. 
Leave to one side the politics. The full blown market based development strategies 
implemented in the 1980s and 1990s, in Africa and Latin America, cannot be said to have 
had the beneficial impact that was predicted for them. Growth did not recover. Poverty in 
Africa increased. Eastern Europe had an economic and social catastrophe. Asia had the 
notable success stories of China and India, but these cannot have been said to have been 
following the converse of central planning. And in Asia and throughout the world, capital 
flows liberalization, a tenet of the post Berlin Wall euphoria, led to the crisis of 1997. 
 
 Time moves on and passions dissipate. This certainly seems to have happened to 
some extent on the trade and capital flows front, where a weary consensus of caution has 
replaced the vehement discord of the 1990s and early 2000s. Partly as a result of the 
acceptance of facts on the ground by both sides, the “liberalize cautiously” mantra has 
provided a formula for discussion of country specificities and speed and sequencing.1 The 
financial crisis of 1997 finally dented the proselytizing of those hell bent on this dimension 
of liberalization. The political realities of job losses in the North came to exert pressure on 
free trade agreements. And the short run costs of trade liberalization came much more into 
the policy-analytical discourse. At the same time, despite debates on nuances and precise 
interpretations of outcomes, it would be a strange sort of world view that would deny the 
importance of  the “opening up” of China and India to trade and investment (while 
maintaining control over capital flows) to the upsurge of growth in those countries in the 
last two decades. Further, while inequality has undoubtedly increased in these countries, 
and growth could have been more pro-poor by a far greater margin, it would be a blinkered 
perspective to say that this growth has had no effect on poverty reduction in those 
countries. 
 
 In an area such as trade, then, cautious pragmatism has to some extent replaced the 
ideologies of yesteryear. But in the area of water privatization, passions are still raw, and 
the intellectual dispute leaves a bitter taste. Those advocating such privatization, however 
cautiously, are accused of putting profit before lives, of selling the national patrimony to 
multinationals, of bringing the market into the buying a selling of a human right. There are, 
no doubt, those who are motivated purely by profit. But on the other side are those, equally 
concerned about the poor, who argue that the current state run system is failing the most 
vulnerable, and who see privatization as a way of breaking the grip of political elites on 
heavily subsidized water—for their big farms and their swimming pools. 
                                                 
1 There is a huge literature, but here are some recent examples: Rodrik (2001), Kanbur2001), Winters, 
McCulloch and McKay (2004), World Bank (2006a), and Kose et. Al. (2006) 
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 Can the divide on water privatization be bridged? I think a first step is to understand 
the precise nature of the disagreements. Are they amenable to empirical resolution and if 
so, how? To what extent do they reflect unresolved methodological or philosophical 
divides which will have to be addressed in order to move forward? And what might be a 
practical process, at least for analysts, of attempting to resolve the differences? These are 
the questions to which this paper is addressed. Section 2 lays out the broad contours of the 
“water wars”. Section 3 undertakes the task of understanding these disagreements, in the 
broader context of disagreements on development strategies more generally. Section 4 
discusses the way forward and concludes. 
 
 
2. The Water Wars 
 
 There is by now a huge literature on water privatization. The term “water wars” 
referred originally to the famous protests in Cochabamba, Bolivia, in 2000, when the 
government sold the municipal water supply of that city to an international water company. 
There have been other water wars of this type, with tragic loss of life. The street battles 
have been reflected in water wars of another type, among policy analysts, between those 
broadly supportive of water privatization and those opposed. This literature has ranged 
from the prosaic and academic to the populist and polemical. Much of the debate has taken 
place on the web. I want to pick out two recent contributions to represent the alternative 
perspectives that I will examine in depth—Shiva (2005) and Segerfeldt (2005a). I pick 
these not only because they are by prominent protagonists, but because they present the 
positions cogently and intelligently, even though they do so in somewhat polemical vein.2
 
 Vandana Shiva (2005) provides a recent, trenchant, account of the water wars from 
the Indian perspective, and is worth quoting extensively and reading carefully: 
 
 “On 13th June 2005, 5 farmers were shot dead in Tonk during a protest demanding 
their share in the water from Bisalpur dam, which is diverting water from villages to the 
city of Jaipur under an ADB project for water sector “reforms” in the State of Rajasthan 
currently ruled by a BJP government….Yet the Congress government in Delhi is 
determined to create another Tonk in Muradnagar, with its demand to divert 635 million 
litres of Ganga water per day to the Sonia Vihar Plant, which has been privatized to Ondeo 
Degrement a subsidiary of Suez…..The real politics of water is not Congress vs. BJP. It is 
World Bank/ADB and other aid agencies creating water markets for global water MNCs 
while robbing the Indian people both hydrologically and financially….[T]he World Bank 
started to push the Delhi government to privatize Delhi’s water supply….The contract 
between Delhi Jal Board….and the French company Ondeo Degrement (subsidiary of Suez 
Lyonnaise des Eaux Water Division—the water giant of the world), is supposed to provide 
safe drinking water for the city….On December 1, 2004, water tariffs were increased in 
Delhi. While the government stated this was necessary for recovering costs of operation 
                                                 
2 Some other contributions (a very small selection)  from the web are Obando (2003), Public Citizen (2003), 
Barlow and Clarke (2004) on one side, and Moore (2003), Bailey (2005), and Galiani, Gertler and 
Shargrodsky (2002), on the other. 
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and maintenance, the tariff increase is more than ten times what is needed to run Delhi’s 
water supply. The increase is to lay the ground for the privatization of Delhi’s water, and 
ensure super profits for the private operators….The tariff increase is not a democratic 
decision, nor a need based decision. It has been imposed by the World Bank. The Delhi Jal 
Board cites the justification for increase in tariff as based on a study done by Price 
Waterhouse Cooper under the World Bank study on privatization….The tariff increase 
hides significant increases through changes in categories….”Piaos”, a core part of India’s 
culture of the gift of water, must also now pay for water. How will they give water to the 
thirsty? Cremation grounds, temples, homes for the disabled, orphanages which paid Rs. 30 
will now pay thousands of rupees ….The World Bank driven policies explicitly state that 
there needs to be a shift from the social perception to a commercial operation. This 
worldview conflict lies at the root of conflicts between water privatization and water 
democracy. Will water be viewed and treated as a commodity, or will it be viewed and 
treated as the very basis of life?....The common argument for privatization and price 
increase is that higher costs will reduce water use. However, given extreme income 
inequities, a tariff increase that can destroy a slum dweller or poor farmer is an 
insignificant expenditure for the rich. Privatization as dictated by ADB and he World Bank 
thus means that water will be diverted from the poor to the rich, from rural areas to 
urban/industrialized areas…..The government’s priority for commodification and 
privatization of water was clearly stated by the Planning Commission Deputy Chairman, 
Montek Singh Ahluwalia….While Mr. Ahluwalia argued that rich farmers are the real 
beneficiaries of free water, it is the rich who can afford to pay. The poor peasant, already 
struggling under the burden of debt, driven to suicide, will be wiped out if she/he is denied 
access to water and made to pay for a resources that is their common property….The 
Deputy Chairman stated that “chasing short term benefits that accrue from vote bank 
politics, instead of seeking long term gains that flow from prudent economic policies, has 
become the bane of our decision-making process.”….What Mr. Ahluwalia is calling “short 
term benefits that accrue from vote bank politics” others call democracy. What he refers to 
as “prudent economic policies” are the World Bank/IMF/ADB paradigm of water 
privatization which has already led to the killing of farmers in Tonk and could leads to 
many more water wars….Water is a commons, a public good. Privatization is the enclosure 
of the water commons. Water privatization aggravates the water crisis because it rewards 
the waste of the affluent, not the conservation of resource prudent communities. 
Sustainable and equitable use needs water democracy, not water privatization.” 
 
 The alternative perspective I want to examine is provided by Segerfeldt (2005a)3, 
which is also worth quoting extensively and reading carefully: 
 
 “Ninety-seven percent of all water distribution in poor countries is managed by the 
public sector, which is largely responsible for more than a billion people being without 
water. Some governments of impoverished nations have turned to business for help, usually 
with good results. In poor countries with private investments in the water sector, more 
people have access to water than in those without such investments. Moreover, there are 
many examples of local businesses improving water distribution. Superior competence, 
better incentives and better access to capital for investment have allowed private 
                                                 
3 This is an op-ed piece based on a volume, Segerfeldt (2005b). 
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distributors to enhance both the quality of the water and the scope of its distribution. 
Millions of people who lacked water mains within reach are now getting clean and safe 
water delivered within a conventional distance….The main argument of the anti-
privatization movement is that privatization increases prices, making water unaffordable 
for millions of poor people. In some cases it does, in others not. But the price of water for 
those already connected to a mains network should not be the immediate concern. Instead, 
we should focus on those who lack access to mains water; usually the poorest in poor 
countries….They usually purchase water from small-time vendors, paying an average of 12 
times more than for water from regular mains, and often more than that. When the price of 
water for those already connected goes up, the distributor gets both the resources to enlarge 
the network and the incentives to reach as many new customers as possible. When prices 
are too low to cover the costs of laying new pipes, each new customer entails a loss rather 
than a profit, which makes the distributor unwilling to extend the network. Therefore, even 
a doubling of the price of mains water could actually give poor people access to cheaper 
water than before….True, many privatizations have been troublesome. Proper supervision 
has been missing. Regulatory bodies charged with enforcing contracts have been non-
existent, incompetent or too weak. Contracts have been badly designed and bidding 
processes sloppy. But these mistakes do not make strong arguments against privatizations 
as such, but against bad privatizations. Let us, therefore, have a discussion on how to make 
them better, instead of rejecting them altogether. Greater scope for businesses and the 
market has already saved many lives in Chile and Argentina, in Cambodia and the 
Philippines, in Guinea and Gabon. There are millions more to be saved.” 
 
 I believe that most if not all of the main points in the water privatization discourse 
are encapsulated in these two quotes, from two well known sources on the two sides of the 
debate. We would do well to study these to identify the nature of the disagreements as a 
starting point in the process to see if a reconciliation is possible and, if so, how to get it. 
The next section begins the task of understanding the disagreements. 
 
 
3. Understanding Disagreements 
 
 Let us try to enumerate the disagreements on water privatization as evidenced in 
Shiva (2005) and Segerfeldt (2005a). We should note at the outset that as actually 
implemented, “privatization” is of many types—this is implicitly if not explicitly 
acknowledged in the two quotes. But the central thrust is clear. It is to move from primary 
state control in the provision of water services to a greater role for private investors, market 
pricing, and the profit motive. Given this broad definition, how can people with same 
objectives, of helping the poor and reducing poverty, differ so much? It is useful to 
consider the disagreements under two broad headings—consequentialist and deontological. 
In a consequentialist based argument, the only thing that matters are outcomes and their 
evaluation. The evaluations can be empirical, looking at actual outcomes, or theoretical, 
looking at outcomes predicted by a particular form of reasoning (a model of the world). 
Disagreements can arise on the value judgments used in the evaluation of outcomes, on the 
actual outcomes (in the empirical frame), or on the model (in the theoretical frame). In the 
extreme form of a deontological argument, consequences are beside the point. What 
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matters is an assessment of the process, and disagreements can arise over different 
frameworks for such an assessment. Let us take each of these categories in turn. 
 
 In earlier work, I tried to understand the nature of disagreements on broad 
macroeconomic policy, distribution and poverty in a consequentialist mode (Kanbur, 
2001a). I set to one side differences in objectives--how outcomes are evaluated--and 
concentrated on disagreements linking policies and outcomes. I asked the question—how 
can people with the same objectives differ so much about policy when they have the same 
objectives and, to a large extent, the same data? I argued that the answer lay in different 
perspectives that people bring to the discussion, along three dimensions—aggregation, time 
horizon and market power. Dividing the main protagonists into two for simplicity and 
clarity, I characterized one as the “Civil Society tendency” (CS) and the other as the 
“Finance Ministry tendency” (FM). I suggested that the latter has a world view that is more 
aggregated, with a longer time horizon, and a tendency to ascribe competitive structure to 
markets.  
 
On aggregation, the CS world view is more “worm’s eye” than “bird’s eye”. Thus, 
for example, national level poverty statistics will be deployed by FM, and these will 
naturally aggregate gainers and losers. On the other hand, CS will focus on the losers, 
especially the poorest losers. It is cold comfort for a poor person who has been made poorer 
because of a policy, to be told that other people, even other poor people, have been made 
worse off.4 On time horizon, the CS view worries more about the immediate negative 
impacts of a policy on the poor as opposed to the FM perspective that often emphasize the 
medium term benefits, for poverty, of the same policy. Trade liberalization is a classic case, 
where the short term costs on those displaced have to be set against the longer term benefits 
from greater openness. Publications like World Bank (2006a) have eventually conceded the 
importance of the former in the poverty debate, and the discussion has shifted much more 
to compensation and safety net mechanisms, as compared to the trade liberalization 
mantras of the 1980s and 1990s. Finally, on market structure, the CS perspective sees 
market (and political) power everywhere it turns, whereas the basic economic models that 
underpin the FM analysis are competitive in nature. As argued in Kanbur (2001), this is 
another dimension explaining the benign (or supportive) and cautious (or opposing) stances 
taken by the two sides on major issues of economic policy reform. With a non-competitive 
market structure, the argument that benefits of policy reform are likely to be appropriated 
by a powerful elite hold greater sway. 
 
I believe that the above framework for understanding disagreements in the 
consequentialist mode is a useful one to apply to the water privatization debate. For a start, 
the CS/FM divide is clearly seen in the debate set up by Vandana Shiva (2005) between 
herself and Montek Ahluwalia, the effective head of the Indian Planning Commission, and 
former Finance Secretary to the Government of India. More substantively, however, there 
is clearly a disagreement between her and Segerfeldt (2005a) on the actual outcomes of 
water privatization. For Segerfeldt (2005a), privatizations have come “usually with good 
results,” despite problems in some cases. For Shiva (2005), it is quite the opposite. This is 
generally the case among many Civil Society organizations. Thus Public Citizen (2003), in 
                                                 
4 I have developed this argument in greater detail in Kanbur (2005). 
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a report entitled “Water Privatization Fiascos,” presents no fewer than five case studies 
from developing countries Argentina, Bolivia, The Philippines, Indonesia and South 
Africa) to illustrate the title of the publication. Yet Segerfeldt (2005a) argues that “the 
market has saved many lives in Chile and Argentina, in Cambodia and the Philippines, in 
Guinea and Gabon.” It cannot escape notice that there is an overlap of countries in the two 
lists. How can it be that such opposite conclusions are drawn from the same experience? 
 
To explore this issue, let us consider the specific case of Argentina, and compare 
the analysis of Public Citizen (2003) and Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2002). Here is 
how the latter summarize their conclusion, based on state of the art econometric analysis: 
 
“In the 1990s Argentina embarked on one of the largest privatization campaigns in 
the world including the privatization of local water companies covering approximately 30 
percent of the country’s municipalities. Using the variation in ownership of water provision 
across time and space generated by the privatization process, we find that child mortality 
fell by 8 percent in the areas that privatized their water services; and that the effect was 
largest (26 percent) in the poorest areas. We check the robustness of these estimates using 
cause specific mortality. While privatization is associated with significant reductions in 
deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases, it is uncorrelated with deaths from causes 
unrelated to water conditions.” 
 
Public Citizen (2003) on the other hand says the following of the Buenos Aires 
privatization in 1993: 
 
“During the first eight years of the contract, weak regulatory practices and contract 
renegotiations that eliminated corporate risk enabled the Suez subsidiary, Aguas Argentinas 
S.A., to earn a 19% profit rate on its average net worth….According to Fernando de la 
Rua….(speaking in March 1999 when he was Mayor of Buenos Aires): “Water rates, 
which Aguas Argentinas said would be reduced by 27% have actually risen 20%. These 
prices have increases, and the cost of service extension, have been borne by the urban poor. 
Non-payment for water and sanitation are as high as 30 percent, and service cutoffs are 
common with women and children bearing the brunt with health and safety consequences.” 
 
Two more opposing descriptions of outcomes could hardly be possible. 
According to one analysis, the privatization was an unmitigated disaster. According to 
another, it saved children’s lives. And these are the views taken by the CS and FM 
tendencies. Can they be resolved? One possible route is to consider aggregation, time 
horizon and market structure. The impact effect of the price increases, emphasized by 
Public Citizen 92003) with the quote from de la Rua, would indeed have been to hurt all 
current users of water services—by definition. Some of these would have been poor 
households. But what of the longer term? If connections increased because of the increased 
profit, and if some of these connections were to poorer neighborhoods, then previously 
underserved poor households would have got clean water, and this could have led to 
reduced child deaths, as is claimed by Galiani et. Al. (2002). Both perspectives are in some 
sense right. The short term pain to poor households is highlighted by one. The greater long 
term gain to other poor households is highlighted by the other. There is no easy resolution 
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between these two competing perspectives on evaluation. In addition, there is the market 
structure issue. There is a basic mistrust of non-competitive market structures, and a great 
fear that market power will increase once granted, among the CS tendency. The “natural 
monopoly” issue with water is well recognized by the FM tendency, who do say that 
regulation will be necessary as a result, but in general they seem to be more fearful of 
government failure than market failure. For the CS tendency, as seen in Shiva (2005) the 
answer is not in privatization combined by regulation, but in state ownership combined by 
democratic control. The counter to this, as in Segerfeldt (2005) is that as a matter of fact 
state ownership is failing the poor because of elite capture. Paradoxically, then, 
privatization, which is feared by CS as the route to concentration of power, is seen by FM 
as the route to breaking the power of the political elite who are diverting state services to 
their own end! 
 
 All of the above is in a consequentialist mode of thinking where the only thing that 
matters is the outcome. But there is another strand to CS critique of water privatization 
which is more deontological in nature. This is alluded to by Shiva (2005) when she talks 
about the cultural role that “gift of water” plays in India. A bolder statement is found in 
Obando (2003): 
 
 “Water is a fundamental and inalienable human right and a common good that 
every person and institution of this plane should protect. This resource is, like air, a 
heritage of humanity and must be declared that way. Water is not a merchandize and no 
person or institution should be allowed to get rich from the sale of it. It should not be 
privatized, marketed, exported or transferred to a few multinational companies, which 
today already control 90 percent of privatized utilities. For the GATT, NAFTA and FTAA, 
water is a commodity, an investment, a simple service for commercial use and profit.” 
 
Leaving to one side the concern about monopoly market structure, which has been 
discussed above, this perspective is fundamentally opposed to the buying and selling of 
water. This is difficult for economists with their “consequentialist gene” to comprehend. 
Why take such a position? Why not base the argument on the consequences of alternative 
arrangements—state, market, or in between? The answer can perhaps be found if we pose 
the following question. On this argument, why not leave the market for child sex to a 
consequentialist decision? Or the market for human slaves? Reflection on this will reveal 
that there are some commodities, the trading of which cannot be countenanced no matter 
what the consequences. Indeed, the consequences may be harmful, but that is not the point. 
The argument stops well before we get to those. At the very least the argument is at a 
different level. 
 
 I have addressed this issue in earlier work under the heading of “Obnoxious 
Markets” (Kanbur, 2004). Why and how exactly is the market for apples different from that 
for slaves? Somewhat paradoxically, I tried to understand this deontological question by 
examining consequences: 
 
 “Certain markets evoke popular discomfort, distrust and even outrage. Trade in 
arms, 
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drugs, toxic waste, child labor and body parts, for example, elicits these reactions to 
different 
degrees. This paper asks—what is it about some markets that brings about these responses? 
It is argued that three key parameters—extremity, agency and inequality—have a bearing 
on our intuitive reactions and serve to differentiate markets. The more extreme are the 
likely outcomes of a market, the further is the agent who acts in the market from agents 
who bear the consequences of those actions, and the greater is the degree of inequality in 
market relations, the more likely it is that the operation of the market will provoke 
discomfort. At the extreme, when outcomes are potentially extreme, agency is minimal and 
market relations are highly unequal, the market in question may deserve the label 
“obnoxious”. 
 
Using these criteria, I then looked at a number of markets and concluded that “Each 
Obnoxious Market is Obnoxious in Its Own Way” (one of the section titles). I argued that 
markets for child prostitution or body parts were furthest along the spectrum to being 
“obnoxious”, while those for soft drugs might not be quite so far along. 
 
 Where do water markets fit into the spectrum? Water transactions, or at least a lack 
of water, can lead to extreme consequences. In this, it is like transactions in toxic waste or 
body parts. In terms of agency, the market for child labor is problematic because it is not 
entirely clear that the agent making he decisions, the parent or the household, necessarily 
has the full interests of the child at heart. The agency issue, is not quite so sharp in the case 
of water, I believe. The inequality issue can be introduced by again considering child labor. 
Many economists chide opponents of child labor by saying that their actions actually make 
poor children worse off, since they cannot now bring in income and may be forced to worse 
forms of income earning (like child prostitution). But this is to miss the point of the visceral 
reaction against child labor. From this perspective it is not that child labor can earn income 
and therefore reduce poverty, it is rather a reaction against a state f the world where 
children have to work to relive their poverty. Translating into the water world, it is not so 
much that charging for water may in the long run lead to more investment and thus make 
poor people better off; it is rather the very fact of poor people having to pay for a life 
giving resource that jars. Taking all of these considerations into account, we might be able 
to unpack and understand the fundamental reaction against water privatization from some 
CS groups. It goes beyond consequences. It flows from the same body of argument that 
says there should not be markets in some commodities, period. 
 
4. The Way Forward 
 
 It should be clear that the nature of the disagreement has to be understood before we 
can devise a way forward. It is not possible to easily bridge the deontological divide 
between those who are simply against markets for water for the same reason they are 
against markets for slaves, and those who wish to make a decision based on an assessment 
of outcomes of creating markets versus not. At least, I do not see an easy way forward if 
that is the divide. But if, as is mostly the case, the divide is one over assessing 
consequences, then in principle the divide can be bridged. 
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 For some, “it is unlikely that this controversy will be resolved” (McGranahan and 
Satterthwaite). Others (UN-Habitat, 2003; UNDP, 2006) are taking a middle road, arguing 
that it all depends on the context and how privatization is done. The question can also be 
changed to “how to ensure that both private and public operators can be made to provide 
better services to low-income areas” (McGranahan and Satterthwaite, 2006). Certainly, the 
rhetoric of organizations that were once hard charging on water privatization is much 
curbed. The comprehensive World Bank (2006b) document on water privatization talks of 
presenting possible options instead of a “single best approach” (pxiii), and acknowledges 
that in the process of privatization the government “may want to protect some vulnerable 
groups (such as the poor)” (p.47). All of this is worthwhile and represents progress 
compared to a few years ago. But one cannot skirt around the basic disagreements. The 
World Bank (2006b) document, admirably open though it is compared to earlier statements 
from the institution, is essentially about different ways of privatizing. And the statements of 
Shiva (2005) and Segerfeldt (2005a) are from two years ago, not twenty or ten years ago. 
These disagreements persist, and will reappear sooner or later, perhaps in a different guise, 
despite attempts to smooth over them or get around them by avoiding them. They must be 
addressed. 
 
 In light of the way I have described the nature of disagreements over water 
privatization, it should be clear that I view bridging the divide as a process rather than a 
one-shot outcome. It will involve disciplined and respectful dialogue where analysts from 
both sides take seriously the claims of the other and examine the issues with the aid of a 
common information base on actual cases and situations. It will also involve a willingness 
to understand the other side’s perspective on the matter, and to question one’s own 
presuppositions. Since I am an economist, my writings have usually exhorted economists 
and those in the FM tendency more generally) to be more open and more humble about 
their findings and frameworks. From the trenchancy of some of the writing on the Civil 
Society side, I suppose one could make an exhortation in that direction as well. 
 
 Specifically, it would be a useful to consider a well thought out, well planned out, 
and well organized forum where thoughtful proponents of the two perspectives on water 
privatization could come together to examine empirical evidence case by case—starting, 
for example, with the case of Buenos Aires. The objective initially would be not so much to 
arrive at an answer, but to understand the different methods of analysis and different ways 
of formulating questions. After a few such meetings, we would be in a position to judge 
whether the divide can be bridged. That, to me, would be a good start. 
 10
References 
 
Bailey, Ronald. 2005. “Water is Human Right: How Privatization Gets Water to the Poor.” 
Reason online. August 17, 2005. http://www.reason.com/news/printer/34992.html
Accessed February 14, 2007. 
 
Barlow, Maude and Tony Clarke. 2004. “Water Privatization: the World bank’s Latest 
Market Fantasy.” Global Policy Forum. http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-
wto/wbank/2004/01waterpriv.htm
Accessed February 14, 2007.  
 
Galiani, Sebastian, Paul Gertler and Ernest Schargrodsky. 2002. “Water for Life: The 
Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality.” University of California 
at Berkeley. 
http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/gertler/working_papers/Water%20for%20Life%20June30.
pdf
 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2001a. “Economic Policy, Distribution and poverty: The Nature of 
Disagreements.” World Development. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2001b. “Growth and Trade: The Last Redoubt?” Cornell University. 
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/EasterlyWBReview.pdf
Accessed March 5, 2007. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2004. “On Obnoxious Markets.” In Stephen Cullenberg and Prasanta 
Pattanaik (editors), Globalization, Culture and the Limits of the Market: Essays in 
Economics and Philosophy. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/Obnoxious%20Markets.pdf
Accessed March 8, 2007. 
 
Kanbur, Ravi. 2005. “Pareto’s Revenge.” Journal of Social and Economic Development. 
http://www.arts.cornell.edu/poverty/kanbur/ParRev.pdf  
Accessed March 6, 2007. 
 
Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shan-Jin Wie. 2006. “Financial 
Globalization: A Reappraisal.”  International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 06/189. 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06189.pdf
 
McGranahan, Gordon and David Satterthwaite. 2006. “Governance and Getting the Private 
Sector to Provide Better Water and Sanitation Services to the Urban Poor.” International 
Institute for Environment and Development. Human Settlements Discussion Paper Series. 
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/10528IIED.pdf
Accessed March 8, 2007. 
 
Moore, Adrian. 2003. “Why Water Privatization Adds Up.” Reason online. November 21, 
2003. http://www.rppi.org/waterprivatization.shtml
 11
Accessed February 14, 2007. 
 
McGranahan, Gordon, and David Satterthwaite. 2006. “Governance and Getting the Private 
Sector to Provide Better Water and Sanitation Services to the Urban Poor.” International 
Institute for Environment and Development. 
http://www.iied.org/pubs/pdf/full/10528IIED.pdf
Accessed March 5, 2007. 
 
Obando, Ana Elena. 2003. “Women and Water Privatization.” WHRnet. 
http://www.whrnet.org/docs/issue-water.html
Accessed February 14, 2007. 
 
Public Citizen. 2003. Water Privatization Fiascos: Broken Promises and Social Turmoil. 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/privatizationfiascos.pdf
Accessed March 6, 2007. 
 
Rodrik, Dani. 2001. “Globalization, Growth and Poverty: Is the World Bank Beginning to 
Get It?” Harvard University. 
http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/WB%20oped.pdf
Accessed March 5, 2007. 
 
Segerfeldt, Fredrik. 2005a. “Private Water Saves Lives.” Financial Times, August 25, 
2005. http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=4462
Accesses February 14, 2007. 
 
Segerfeldt, Fredrik. 2005b. Water for Sale: How Business and the market can resolve the 
World’s Water Crisis. Cato Institute. Washington, D.C. 
 
Shiva, Vandana. 2005. “Water Privatization and Water Wars.” Znet Commentary, July 12, 
2005. http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2005-07/12shiva.cfm. Accessed 14 
February, 2007. 
 
UNDP. 2006. Human Development Report 2006: Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the 
Global Water Crisis. Oxford University Press. 
 
UN-Habitat. 2003. Water and Sanitation in the World’s Cities: Local Action for Global 
Goals. Earthscan, London. 
 
Winters, L. Alan, Neil McCulloch, and Andrew McKay. 2004. “Trade Liberalization and 
Poverty: The Evidence So Far.” Journal of Economic Literature 42(1): 72–115. 
 
World Bank. 2006a. Assessing World Bank Support for Trade, 1987-2004: An IEG 
Evaluation. Independent Evaluation Group, World Bank. Washington, D.C. 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/trade/docs/trade_evaluation.pdf
Accessed March 6, 2007 
 
 12
World Bank. 2006b. Approaches to Private Participation In Water Services: A Toolkit. 
Washington, D.C. 
http://rru.worldbank.org/Documents/Toolkits/Water/Water_Full.pdf
Accessed March 8, 2007. 
 
 
 13

